WHAT CAUSES OF ACTION MAY BE JOINED IN ONE COUNT UNDER THE CONNECTICUT PRACTICE7 ACT by unknown
YALE
LAW JOURNAL
VOL. VII MARCH, 1898 No. 6
WHAT CAUSES OF ACTION MAY BE JOINED IN
ONE COUNT UNDER THE CONNECTICUT
PRACTICE7 ACT.
The following memorandum of decision was rendered by Hon.
* Samuel 0. Prentice, Judge of the Superior Court, in February,
c898, and is now on file in the office of the Clerk at New Haven.
The action which is now pending in that Court is for the loss
of goods shipped by theplaintiff over defendant's railroad. The
plaintiff stated in one count that the goods were delivered to the
defendant as a common carrier at common law; that at the time
of the delivery of the goods certain bills of lading were also de-
livered to and accepted by the defendant, but that there was no
consideration for the bills of lading, that they were unreasonable
and unjust in their terms, and that therefore they were not bind-
ing contracts, and that the defendant had no right to the limita-
tion of liability expressed therein. Under these circumstances,
the plaintiff claimed that, in spite of the bills of lading, the de-
fendant was liable as a common carrier at common law, and
alleged the failure of the defendant to carry and deliver the goods.
The plaintiff went on to say that if the bills of lading were valid,
then the defendant was liable because the goods were lost through
its negligence.
Defendant moved to correct the complaint by requiring th(
plaintiff to state upon which cause of action it relied, or t,
separate the causes of action. The case was argued at length
plaintiff relying principally upon the decision of the Suprem
Court of Connecticut in the case of Craft Refrigerating Co.
Quinnipiac Brewing Co. EDITOR.
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THE WINCHESTER REPEATING
ARMS COMPANY Stperior Court,
VS. N H ew Haven Couny,
THE. NEW YORK, NEW HAVEN the 9th day ofFebruary,
AND HARTFORD RAILROAD X.89.
COMPANY.
MEMORANDUM UPON MOTION DE SUBSTITUTED COMPLAINT.
This complaint in one count contains statements of divers
facts, some pertinent to a right of recovery upon one ground,
and some upon another. The plaintiff justifies this combination
of allegations in one count, upon the authority of The Craft Re-
frigerating Company v. The Quinnipiac Brewing Company, 63
Conn. 551 .
The question is thus raised as to the scope and effect of this
oft-cited case. By the profession generally it has apparently
been received as it has by counsel for the plaintiff as sanction-
ing as proper pleading the filing in court as a complaint of any
leaf of history between persons which may be said to relate to
any single transaction, using that term in its most comprehen-
sive sense, however varied and many-sided that transaction may
be. As necessary sequels to this manner of pleading it is con-
ceived that the plaintiff may shift his position as often as he is
pleased or forced to do so, as the case progresses, as long as he
keeps under the cover of any of the averments of his complaint;
that the opposite party and the court are put to the hazard of
searching out at their peril for defense, trial, ruling and de-
cision, the many causes or rights of action which may be con-
cealed within its miltitudinous allegations, and that the plaintiff
has under it a carte blanche to recover for any cause of action
which his opponent shall fail to discover or successfully defend.
Against such doctrine I must protest as being subversive of
the very purpose of pleading and paving the way for all manner
of uncertainty, confusion, pleading entanglement and even ulti-
mate injustice. If we have come to the point where such plead-
ing is permissible we have indeed taken a long step backward
towards that primitive time when parties appeared in person be-
fore the magistrate and told their story in open court, and the
magistrate adjudged as upon the whole seemed to him just and
right. Modern conditions, I fancy, do not admit of such
methods.
Phillips, in commenting upon the requirement of the codes
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for separate statement of causes of action, makes the following
pertinent remarks:
"Such statement of causes is clearly indispensable to an
orderly system of pleading. In no other way can the legal
sufficiency of any one cause be tested by demurrer; in no other
way can different defenses be made to the different causes; in
no other way can separate and distinct issues be made and tried;
in no other way can the introduction of evidence be intelligently
conducted; and in no other way can the record be made clearly
to show what matters have been adjudicated and how decided.
The provision for the joinder of distinct demands in one action is
for the convenience and economy of litigants, and its object may
be promoted by liberality in its application, but the require-
ment that causes of action when joined shall be separately stated
is to enhance the certainty, the precision and the safety of pro-
cedure, and its object can be promoted only by enforcing it with
reasonable strictness." (Phillips on Code Pleading, Sec. 202.)
Such doctrine, however, as that to which I have referred as
having been drawn from the Craft case, I am confident is not
supported by that case. It is doctrine which I believe to be
plainly repugnant to the express provisions of our Practice Act
and of all known codes, and I fail to discover what there is in
the opinion in the Craft case, when properly interpreted, which
warrants the conclusions which have been drawn from it.
The doctrine of that case, as I understand it, is simply and
only this: that where a single inseparable state of facts gives
rise to two or more rights of action, or where the plaintiff upon
such statement of facts may upon differing constructions thereof
be entitled to differing relief, the complaint in a single count,
setting up these facts may, in the first case entitle him to de-
mand and have any of the several kinds of relief which the facts
in any aspect of them support, or in the second case, to demand
alternative relief appropriate to the different constructions which
the law may place upon the facts, and have such relief as the
true construction warrants.
There are many states of fact which give rise to more than
one right of action, as for instance, one in contract, and another
in tort. A complaint setting up such states of fact may contain
matter pertinent to each right of action, and no matter not perti-
nent to both. The Craft Refrigerating Company case very
properly holds, as I shall have occasion to further notice later,
that such a complaint in one count is good; that the plaintiff
may go to trial thereon without electing which right of action
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he will pursue, and that he may thereunder be given such relief
as the facts may warrant.
There, however, may be other conditions, to wit:
i. A count may contain allegations, all of which are appro-
priate to one right of action, while at the same time a portion of
them are also appropriate to and sufficiently support, another
right of action, the remainder being altogether inappropriate to
such second right of action.
2. A count may contain allegations, a part of which are
pertinent and appropriate, and a part impertinent and inappro-
priate to each of two or more rights of action.
With respect to such counts the principle of the Craft case
does not apply. To so hold would be to violate the clear and'
express provisions of the Practice Act. Section 878 of the Gen-
eral Statutes provides what may be joined in a complaint, and
how such joinder may be made. The pertinent requirements
are, (i) That several causes of action may, under certain condi-
tions be joined in one complaint, and (2) that such causes of
action so joined must be separately stated.
Another pertinent provision is that which permits the joinder
in one complaint of causes of action "arising out of the same
transaction, or transactions connected with the same subject of
action."
In order to arrive at a correct understanding of what the
effect of this section of the statutes is, it is necessary to have a
clear conception of the meaning of the terms which it employs,
to wit, "right of action," "cause of action," and "transaction."
A "right of action" is the secondary right to relief which
springs from the invasion of some primary right. It is the right
to relief appropriate to the facts from which the right of action
springs.
A "cause of action," on the other hand, to quote the lan-
guage of Pomeroy, is the situation or state of facts from which
a "right of action" springs. The facts from which a remedial
right-that is, a right to relief-arises, constitutes the "cause of
action."
Phillips, in commenting upon this distinction between a
"right of action" and a "cause of action," uses this language:
"From the foregoing definitions of 'right of action' and 'cause
of action' it will be seen that the former is a remedial right
falling to some person, and that the latter is a formal statement
of the operative facts that give rise to such remedial fact.'"
(Phillips on Code Pleading, Sec. 31).
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A "transaction" is something quite apart from a "right of
action," and something more comprehensive than a "cause of
action." The term is one which has been seldom defined and to
which it is hard to give a definition helpful in practical applica-
tions and suited to all circumstances. Our Supreme Court in
the Craft case, however, has said that a transaction "consists of
an act or agreement, or several acts or agreements, having
some connection with each other, in which more than one person
is concerned, and by which the legal relations of such persons
between themselves are altered."
A definition in different language, but to the same general
effect, might be made upon the basis of Pomeroy's anaylsis
somewhat as follows: "A single continuous connected proceed-
ing, negotiation, or conduct of business between parties, charac-
terized by a unity of action and circumstance, and forming one
affair."
Definitions aside, however, it is certain that from a single
"transaction" several "causes of action" may arise, each giving
to the injured party one or more "rights of action."
In this connection it ought to be observed that a "right of
action" is to be distinguished from the. object of the action.
The object of the action is the relief which is sought. The
"right of action" is the right to that relief which arises from the
facts which constitute the "cause of action." In actions at law
the object, whatever the "right of action" may be, is generally
damages.
A "right of action" at law always arises from the existence
of a right and the invasion of it by some wrong on the part of
another. The "cause of action" is the facts which establish the
right and the wrong. Its statement is therefore only a state-
ment of these facts. Such statement , is single if it sets up only
one right invaded by one wrong. It is double if -it sets up
either two rights invaded by one wrong or one right invaded by
two wrongs.
If now we examine Section 878 with these distinctions and
principles in mind, its interpretation becomes clear, and its
operation simple. Where there is a single state of facts from
which a right to relief arises, there is but one "'cause of action."
A count, therefore, which sets up such a state of facts, and that
only, states but one "cause of a.ction" in the sense in which that
phrase is used respecting the" joinder of actions, no matter how
many rights of action may spring from these facts. Of course,
causes of action might be differentiated, not .only with respect to
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the facts averred, but also with respect to the nature of the
relief sought upon the facts. This narrow distinction, however,
is not the logical one, since the prayer for relief is no part of a
count and no part of the cause of action. Neither is it the
distinction contemplated by the Practice Act. The separation of
causes of action is not to be determined by the relief demanded,
but by the actionable facts alleged, from which the right to re-
dress is claimed to flow. Upon this construction there can
therefore be no joinder of causes of action in a count which sets
up a single set of facts, all pertinent to whatever relief may be
demanded upon those facts. Such a count of necessity alleges
but one right and one invading wrong. Such in the opinion of
the court was the single count complaint in the Craft case.
If now we turn to counts of the second variety heretofore
specified, to wit, those containing allegations all of which are
appropriate to one "right of action," while a portion of them
are also appropriate to and sufficient to support another "right
of action," the remainder being altogether inappropriate to
such second "right of action," the situation becomes at once and
radically changed, if the plaintiff is to be permitted to treat
such counts as good ones for rights of action to which all their
allegations are not appropriate. In such cases there is plainly a
joinder of causes of action. The instant that there is combined
in one count facts appropriate to one cause of action and facts
inappropriate to it, but appropriate to another cause of action,
there arises a joinder of causes of action. This is necessarily so
since, as we have seen, causes of action are only the facts from
which rights of action spring. A statement of a cause of action
being only a recital of facts-a recital of the facts from which
the right of action arises-the consequence is inevitable that
wherever there is contained in a count material allegations
inappropriate to a statement of a cause of action therein, but
pertinent and appropriate to another cause of action, there is a
joinder of causes of action, since there is a joinder of facts issu-
ing independently in different rights df action.
The practical result in such a case should be that the count
should be regarded as one for the right or rights of action to which
all its material allegations are appropriate, and not one upon
which the plaintiff might recover for a right of action to which
only a part of its material allegations are appropriate. Having
himself inserted the additional allegations which give character
to the count as one for those rights of action which all its recitals
support, he should be held to have chosen his ground as he has
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stated it, and not permitted to change it by treating his own
material averments as surplusage. Such a count, under such an
interpretation, would not contain a joinder. It would be simply
a count for a single cause of action, to wit, that cause of action
which all its material averments together support.
Counts of the remaining class, to wit, those containing alle-
gations a part of which are appropriate and a part inappropriate
to each of two or more rights of action, would, for reasons
already discussed and which need not be repeated, contain a
joinder.
If I am correct in this interpretation of Section 878 its pro-
visions become easily intelligible, and their application simple
and satisfactory. There is no longer any mystery as to what a
count may properly embrace, nor mystery as to what rights of
action a count may support. A single count may contain the
statement of a single cause of action, and that only. It is such
a count, if all its material averments are pertinent and appro-
priate to the statement of any one cause of action. If its alle-
gations are in part appropriate and in part inappropriate to each
of two or more causes of action there is a joinder of causes of
action. Where there is a statement of a single cause of action
the plaintiff may have relief for any right of action to which it
entitles him. He can have no relief for rights of action to
which all the material allegations are not pertinent and appro-
priate.
The principles which I have thus laid down are general ones.
In their application to actual conditions, however, they are not
without natural and necessary limitations. Circumstances will
sometimes arise under which, from necessity, or convenience
amounting to a practical necessity, their strict enforcement will
not be required. These circumstances will especially arise
where equitable relief is sought, either as preliminary to or in
connection with, legal relief, or alone, where different forms of
equitable relief are demanded. Equitable causes of action are
frequently not susceptible of that clear and distinct separation
from each other and from the circumstances of the transaction
out of which they arise that legal causes of action are. Legal
rights of action are generally clearly differentiated from each
other, and the facts which issue in them are generally easily
separable in statement from other connected facts. Equitable
rights to relief oftentimes run more closely into each other,
and the facts which issue in them are frequently not conveniently
susceptible of an independent and unassociated statement. The
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Practice Act lays down no hard and fast rules which neither
yield to necessity nor recognize that pleading is but a means to
an end-the end that issues may be framed and relief demanded
and given in a way most conducive to the convenient, orderly,
and proper administration of justice and equity.
The Craft case calls attention to one of these limiting princi-
ples, where it says that "separate and distinct causes of action
within the meaning of the rule are those which are separable
from each other, and separable by some distinct line of demarka-
tion." The opinion observes that in one sense every cause of
action must be separate and distinct from any other, while in
another sense causes of action might differ from each other
only in that distinct and separate claims for relief issue from the
same state of facts.
The Practice Act seeks to require nothing impossible, noth-
ing superfluous, nothing which occasions inconvenience without
a corresponding return. It therefore does not demand separa-
tion of causes of action where the only distinction between
them can be that which arises from the distinct kinds of relief
which may be demanded from a given state of facts; or where a
separation by some distinct line of demarkation is impossible;
or where the ends of good pleading are better and more simply
reached by a departure from strict requirements. The princi-
ples which I have laid down are therefore simply general ones
which are to govern the pleader, unless there is some sufficient
controlling reason for action otherwise. They are not to be
applied in any technical spirit or with microscopic exactness, but
to the end that, upon the one hand, the many and grave evils of
double pleading may be avoided, and, upon the other, that
parties may arrive at issue as simply, directly and distinctly as
they reasonably and properly may.
Having thus discussed principles without much reference to
Connecticut authority, let me now inquire if there is such
authority for contrary views. I submit that there is none. The
Craft case is the only one which has discussed this general ques-
tion to any extent. If it. be carefully studied, I believe that in
its doctrines there will be found nothing subversive of the posi-
tions I have here taken. The court in that case clearly regarded
the complaint as one setting up only a single inseparable state
of facts from which two rights of action sprang-a single cause
of action in the broad and true sense of that term-or at least
two causes of action incapable of separation by any true line of
demarkation.
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Much of the difficulty, I fancy, which has arisen in the inter-
pretation of Section 878, and of the Craft case, has come from a
failure to distinguish a cause of action from a transaction.
These terms have been used so loosely and interchangeably that
the distinction between them which the codes and our Practice
Act emphasizes is too often lost sight of.
The prevalent notion that all that one now needs to do is to
tell, his story, whatever that story may be, and leave to the
opposite party and the court the duty of guessing out what his
cause of action is, has, I must believe, its origin in this mis-
understanding and the consequent misconception of what the
Practice Act requires to be stated. The cause of action-that is,
the facts from which the plaintiff's right or rights of action
spring-are required to be set out. No semblance of authority is
given for setting out a transaction, unless indeed the transaction
in its entirety constitutes a cause of action. The plaintiff is
compelled to discover from the acts and occurrences of the
transaction his cause or causes of action, and set them out sepa-
rately. He is not required, as the Craft case says, to construe
his right under a cause of action and give it a label, as he was
obliged to do in common law pleadings; but he is obliged to
select his cause of action, and make known his claimed actiona-
ble facts which constitute it. The story which the Craft case
says he is permitted to tell as plainly and concisely as may be is
the -story which makes up the cause of action, and not any
longer or more comprehensive story-not the story of a transac-
tion. The Practice Act is careful to make this distinction be-
tween a transaction and a cause of action, and to impose the
duty of separate allegation. It contains express recognition of
"several causes of action arising from the same transaction, or
transactions, connected with the same subject of action."
Having thus laid down the rules by which counts are to be
tested respecting joinder of causes of action therein, it remains
to apply them to the complaint under review. It was appa-
rently, and I believe I may fairly say, confessedly, framed
to enable the plaintiff to recover thereunder upon any cause
of action it might ultimately appear that it had growing
out of the matters covered by its allegations. If not precisely
hydra-headed, it certainly looks in at least six different directions.
Within it are matters which might be held to justify a recovery
under any one of the following conditions:
i. A recovery for the breach of the common law duty of a
common carrier where no express agreement of carriage was made.
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2. A recovery for the breach of the common law duty of
such carrier receiving goods for transportation without an ex-
press agreement for carriage, which breach of duty consisted in
its active negligence.
3. A recovery for the breach by such carrier of an express
contract of carriage.
4. A recovery for the destruction of property delivered to
such carrier under an express contract, which being unreasonable
and unjust in its terms, and improperly exacted from the ship-
per, may not protect it from responsibility for the destruction of
the goods.
5. A recovery for the breach of duty of such carrier by
reason of its own negligence, notwithstanding an express con-
tract of carriage was made.
6. A recovery for negligence pure and simple.
The plaintiff disclaims any thought of preparing the way for
recovery upon the latter ground, but expresses its desire to have
the count so phrased that it would support a recovery if the evi-
dence should disclose the existence of either of the other condi-
tions.
I need not say that in my opinion a count of this kind is
improper.
The fundamental fault in the complaint is that it sets out the
whole transaction. The plaintiff has not sought to gather from
its incidents its cause of action and set that up, or its causes of
action and set them up separately.
It is clear that under the principles I have laid down the
count is not a good one for either the first, second, third, fourth
or sixth causes of action enumerated. The presence therein
of material averments inappropriate to either one of these
c auges of action, but pertinent to other causes of action, leads to
this result. If the count can upon its most liberal construction
be justified as an attempt running through all its allegations to
set up one cause of action, it must be one for the destruction,
through the negligence of the defendant carrier, of goods de-
livered to it for transportation for hire under a special contract,
which, being unreasonable and improperly exacted, could not
exempt it from responsibility for such negligent destruction.
Even in this aspect of the count it-is not free from faults.
If it is sought to allege the existence of a special contract of
carriage, the averments are neither appropriate nor sufficiently
clear. Certain evidential facts are recited, but it is nowhere
apparent, much less distinctly alleged, whether it is claimed
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that a contract existed or not. It is impossible to gather from
the averments what the claimed state of facts, and therefore what
the cause of action is. It is not possible to discover what right of
the plaintiff it claims to have been invaded, or by what precise
wrong it has been invaded.
Section 88o provides that all pleadings shall contain a plain and
concise statement of the material facts upon which the pleader
relies, but not of the evidence by which they are to be proved.
Another requirement of Code Pleading is, that all allegations
shall be direct and certain. Clearly these requirements are not
met in the present complaint.
The defendant's motion is granted to the extent that the
plaintiff is ordered:
i. To separate into distinct counts its several causes of
action, if it desires to rely upon more than one.
2. 'ro state such cause or causes of action in distinct and
certain averments, which shall avoid recitals of evidential mat-
ter, allegations of facts which are not ultimate and operative
facts, and averments of facts which are not material to the
cause of action being stated.
Samud 0. Prentice.
